NAIVE REALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE
The journal Philosophy and Literature is one of the leading locations for contemporary discus sions of the relations between philosophy and lit erature. Recently the journal came out with its 20th Anniversary Issue, a copy of which I re ceived because I had written a book review for the issue. For the fun of it I decided to read the issue from front to back. I was struck by how many of the articles were committed to some form of what has traditionally been called naive realism. 1 Much is said positively about science and scien tific method, whereas schools of thought that have often criticized naive realism, for example post-structuralism and Rortyan pragmatism, come under frequent attack. This is not surpris ing, given that the editorial, by Dennis Dutton and Patrick Henry, focuses on Alan Sokal's ex planation of his now famous hoax against the well-known cultural studies journal Social Text. ' While reading the issue it occurred to me that journals are units of cultural production, and that they should be as open to discussion and critique as anything else. Although it would be difficult to read the entire production of a journal, a special anniversary issue would surely represent the gen eral point of view of the editors and the contribu tors.
Someone might object to criticism of one journal appearing in another, for example in Phi losophy Today. It is my view that writing a cri tique of this sort is not fundamentally different from writing a review of an edited collection of essays. It should also be stressed that I have no in tention to denigrate the work of the editors of Philosophy of Literature, which I consider to be a fine publication. My only desire is to open up new avenues of discussion for the issues raised in that journal.
• My general claim then is that the anniversary issue of Philosophy and Literature, taken as a whole, is a defense of naive realism against the various opponents of that position. (I shall call this defense of naive realism "the new realism.") PHILOSOPHY TODAY 100 Thomas W. Leddy
We certainly need some sort of corrective against the recent excesses of postmodern literary theory and philosophy. But pendulum swings have a way of overcorrecting. Nothing is being said by any of the authors found in this issue about the limits or possible disadvantages of naive realism, or of the metaphysical assumptions behind that position.
Part of reason why these assumptions are not addressed is that the awfulness of the opposition seems so glaring. The new realists frequently and gleefully point to the inscrutable jargon, incon sistencies and bad arguments of their opponents. (Editor, Dennis Dutton, runs a well-known an nual Bad Writing Contest for the "ugliest, most stylistically awful single sentence--or string of no more than three sentences--found in a pub lished scholarly book or article."
5 Some of the winners are simply stunning.) This may lead them to believe that a combination of clarity, logic and scientific method will save literary studies and philosophy from the barbarians. These concerns are certainly legitimate, and nothing I will say here is intended to justify poststructuralist outrages. I would simply like us to engage in a bit of hopefully jargon-free and clear-headed questioning about new realism it self.
First, a comment about the term "realism." Most people would consider themselves realists in some sense. I certainly do. Those who, like myself, are opposed to, or at least critical of the version of realism found in these pages tend tore fer to it as "naive realism." The true realism, on our account, is not naive. Naive realism is not truly realist, not realistic enough. It was a sad mistake for critics of naive realism to have called themselves anti-realists, since this allowed the term "realism" to remain in the hands of their op ponents.
The most fundamental assumption of naive realism is existence, stability, independence and ideal determinability of facts. The naive realist SPRING 1999 Naive realism in philosophy of literature Leddy 
would not go so far as to say, with Wittgenstein, that the world is all that is the case. But the naive realist believes that there is, indeed, all that is the case. For naive realism, the truth is the truth, the facts are the facts. Naive realists believe that the world is totally independent of our interpreta tions of it. They believe that, as confused as our representations may be, the world itself is clear; and that the distinctions between things, espe cially things referred to by accurately developed abstract ideas, are sharply defined. Thus, knowl edge for the naive realist is simply a matter ofbe coming clear about these real-world distinctions.
Here's an example of a naive realist assump tion. Wendell V. Harris asks "Which of us could give a complete and accurate report of everything we did yesterday?" 6 Harris assumes in the very asking of this question that there is such a thing as everything we did yesterday, and that there could, ideally, be a complete and accurate report of it, even though none of us mortals could actually produce it. Since Harris admits that no such ac count has ever been given then what evidence does he have for its existence? There is no denying that the naive realist model of the world works very well in most con texts. It is self-consistent, elegant, explains much, and seems to make those who believe in it comfortable and productive. Naive realists are sensible people, and cheerful too. They may even make better social activists or better scientists, as William Sokal suggests in his article. Sokal de scribes himself as a "stodgy old scientist who be lieves, naively, that there exists an external world, and there exist objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them."' This is a pretty good summary of the position of the new realist.
This attitude is fine for natural scientists. Sokal, a physicist, rightly satirizes those who wish to play literary games with quantum me chanics. But naive realists are, I believe, deeply wrong when they assume that naive realism tells the whole story about reality; that there is an ulti mately clear distinction between external and in ternal reality; that objective truths are simply and purely objective; and that discovery is simply and purely discovery.
The epistemological and metaphysical point I wish to make is a simple one. Naive realists be lieve that the world is fundamentally clear and distinct. But there is no good reason to believe that the world is so, and much reason to believe that it is not.
In doing some research on Indian Aesthetics I recently ran across an old article by Archie J. Bahm which will help me to make my point. 9 Bahm notes that a basic distinction between In dian and Western philosophy is that the Indian philosopher believes that ultimate reality is fun damentally indistinct, whereas the Westerner be lieves that it is fundamentally distinct. ("Advaita Vedanta calls ultimate reality 'Nirguna Brah man,' being without qualities. Samkyhya-Yoga philosophers call the ultimate state of purusha (soul) kaivalya, perfect liberation from all limita tions. Theravada and Sunyavada Buddhists call it 'Nibbana' (Nirvana, no wind) .... All [of these schools] alike, despite their other metaphysical disagreements, depict ultimacy as pure indis tinctness.")10 Indian philosophy then holds that reality is beyond reason "for reason begins to act by making distinctions, and rationality exists only where there are ratios, relationships, differ ences, and distinctness." I am not using this quote to advocate any essentialist distinctions between India and the West. My point is simply that at least some people, for example most of the writ ers for the 20th anniversary issue of Philosophy and Literature, assume the view that Bahm de scribes as Western, i.e. that the world is funda mentally distinct. Nor am I saying that this alter native position is correct. There is no more reason to think that the world is ultimately indistinct than to think that it is ultimately distinct. The point is that there is a range of reasonable possi bility here----one not considered by naive realists.
A historical note: the view that the world is distinct was dominant in analytic philosophy of the first half of the century: was contained in the very notion of "analysis." The new realists sim ply apply the idea of analysis beyond language to reality itself. The analytic philosophers were a bit more modest, but then the success of modern sci ence was a bit more modest then too. Each dis covery of a new human genetic propensity or of a new planet beyond the solar system seems to sup port the view that the world itself is clear and dis tinct. And yet, we know all too well that attempts to find clear and distinct categories in human matters often lead to distortion, as can be seen for example in the troubles entailed by 11 mathematization of economics.
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Is there any reason to believe that the human world (the world as we experience it with refer ence to human values and concerns) is ultimately clear and distinct? Take for example the problem of intentions, so central to the theory of interpre tation. Do we have any reason to believe that the intentions of authors are clearly and distinctly there to be discovered? Do we have any reason to believe that they are there in the same way that pennies in a jar are there? Maybe they are there, but not in a way anything like the way that pen nies in ajar are there. I will have something to say about this later on.
The point I want to make here is metaphysical: that there is reason to believe that an aspect of re ality itself is ultimately indistinct. This is similar to a point I have made elsewhere, that there is a fundamentally metaphorical aspect of reality.
'
The current crop of naive realists are not, to their credit, opposed to metaphors. However they only find metaphors valuable as devices that can help reveal a reality that is fundamentally not meta phorical. (This comes out explicitly, for instance, in Susan Haack's article).
13 This is why naive re alists generally reject the notion of metaphorical truth, or believe that metaphorical truths are true only to the extent that they may be translated into something that is literally true.
This all leads us back to the old debate be tween philosophy and literature, famously re ferred to by Plato. There is an intuition, contained within literature itself, that there is a fundamen tally metaphorical aspect to reality, or maybe even that reality itself is ultimately metaphorical, contradictory, or paradoxical. I am not saying that literary theorists believe this: many of them are on the side of the philosophical mainstream on this issue. I do think that most creative writers and some philosophers (against the example of Plato) would agree that at least some aspect of re ality is itself metaphorical.
To argue this is not to give up the concept of truth, any more than it is to give up realism. A look at Susan Haack's article will help to articu late this point. Haack thinks that philosophy should be scientific in Peirce's sense: that philos ophers should crave to know how things really are, seek the truth, and do so through a scientific method which, in Peirce's view, requires close at tention to the character of everyday experience, not laboratory experimentation. Philosophy, on this view, explores the "·universe of mind" just as PHILOSOPHY TODAY 102 astronomers explore the stars. Haack, in support ing Peirce, seeks to navigate between the Scylla of displacement of philosophy by the natural sci ences, and the Charybdis of its replacement by the literary. Nothing is wrong with this so far.
However, Haack's call for a return to Peirce is for a return to naive realism. Peirce's idea that some items in philosophy will be "finally settled" is a mark of this position. Peirce accepts the false dichotomy that either philosophical questions will be finally settled, or philosophy is a mere ex ercise of cleverness. Haack joins Peirce in attack ing philosophy done in a literary spirit. She thinks such philosophy is a version of"fake rea soning," which occurs when the reasoner is indif ferent to the truth value of the proposition pro pounded. Yet conviction that philosophical questions will never be settled, and partaking in literary spirit, does not necessarily mean a lack of commitment to truth.
The reduction of truth to the truth value of propositions is another sign of naive realism. It assumes that propositions, properly dated, are eternally and unchangingly true or false. Naive realism is strangely like Platonism in this respect. Its eternal Forms are dated propositions. How could such a view be supported empirically? In any case, there are other theories of truth not committed to naive realism, for instance the prag matism of James and Dewey, or Heidegger's dy namic notion of truth as unconcealment ofBeing.
Haack sharply contrasts the aesthetic and the true. She argues that the highest priorities of philosophical writing should be "not elegance, euphony, allusion, suggestiveness, but clarity, precision, explicitness, directness." 14 But what if accepting these as the highest priorities would be inconsistent with the search for truth, for exam ple when doing so distorts the unclear, imprecise, and indirect nature of the subject under study? Why assume that the qualities desirable in philo sophical and scientific writing are the same, and that philosophy and science stand together in op position to literature on this?
I am not questioning the value of clarity and precision as such, but the assumption that all of reality is amenable to this approach, and that sug gestiveness, for example, could never be the best way to reveal reality or truth. Peirce and Haack almost recognize this themselves when they stress the importance of metaphor for philosophy and science, but they do not take the next impor-tant step of recognizing a metaphorical aspect of reality itself.
One can agree with Haack's general point that priorities of philosophical writing are different from literary priorities. The problem is that Haack fails to see that poetry may sometimes just get at truth better than philosophy. Haack con cedes that works ofliterature may express philo sophical insights. But that is not enough. She still assumes that literature cannot express philosoph ical ideas as well as philosophy, since philosophy is explicit, direct and univocal, and literature is not. This ignores the possibility that literature can occasionally get at truth better than philosophy precisely because, or precisely when, it is not ex plicit, direct and univocal (and that philosophy it self can sometimes do better when it is not so ex plicit, direct, and literal-minded). It is doubtful for instance whether a philosopher has ever said anything about the nature of tragedy or love which has not been said better in literature. It seems these days that most of the interesting things being said by philosophers about such things are being said through philosophical inter pretation ofliterature, as in Nussbaum's article in this issue. 15 None of this, however, need lead us to agree with a comment of Richard Rorty's mentioned by Haack that to call a statement true is just to give it a rhetorical pat on the back, or simply to say that it is a belief with which we are able to agree. One need not side with Rorty in holding that philoso phy or science are merely types ofliterature in or der to oppose Haack. 16 The truth about truth is to be found, I believe, someplace between Haack and Rorty. Philosophy is not reducible to rhetoric and literature, but philosophy must come to rec ognize that truth, rhetoric, and narrative are ines capably bound together.
There is a disturbing tendency in many of the articles in this issue to understand the field of de bate as simply consisting of two extremes. Sokal for instance poses his own good objectivism against bad subjectivism. He heads off any possi bility of finding a position between the view that non-context-dependent beliefs exist and can be true, and the view that beliefs are only socially accepted as true ("culturalism"). He insists that people who want to make social change must ac cept the first of these, or else throw out the idea that the Nazi gas chambers were evil, as well as the truth of quantum mechanics. Sokal thinks that not accepting the first position is inevitably to ac cept the second. He doesn't consider that it might just be very useful in certain contexts to believe that non-context-dependent beliefs exist even though nothing is ever totally independent of context, and that this view can be consistent with rejecting culturalism.
This black-or-white attitude can be found in a willingness to accuse others of self contradiction. Wendell Harris, for instance, at tacks post-structuralists for contradicting them selves about the existence of such a thing as "the author's intentions." I am not opposed to attack ing people for self-contradiction. But are the self-contradictions really there? Are they not usually, and to a large degree, constructions of the reading; for example, in this case, of Harris's reading of post -structuralists?
Let us consider for a moment the structure of accusations of self-contradiction. It is seldom no ticed that to find actual instances of sentences of the form "p and •p" is rare. One usually has to in terpret what is said as "p and •p." And since peo ple do not generally intend to contradict them selves, one has to interpret what is said (or written) as "p and --,p" against their implied or even stated intentions! Thus a possible reply to Harris is that the poststructuralist's apparent self-contradictions are in fact Harris's own readerly constructions.
But I think this is only partly right. It makes more sense to say that self-contradictions are re ally there, and they are (in part) constructions. That is, they are really there potentially, and actu alized in construction.
The same point goes with intentions. Contra Harris, post-structuralists need not contradict themselves when they look at the author's in tended meaning, since to accept the existence of intended meaning is not necessarily to accept the naive realist view of intentions as concrete histor ically unchanging objects. One can be a realist about intentions without being a naive realist about intentions; that is, without accepting that there are eternal unchanging facts about inten tions, or that they exist totally independent of our interpretations of them.
Paisley Livingston is also a naive realist about intentions although he qualifies this somewhat, drawing from Jerrold Levinson's discussion of the concept of oeuvre. 17 Levinson rejects the radi cal historicist idea that a work's artistic content
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Moby Dick did not acquire any new artistic con tent because of Joyce even though our knowl edge of Joyce may help us to discover new as pects of Melville.
That seems fine on the surface, and probably works for everyday practice. But it assumes that aspects of Melville's writing are in the writing fully actualized, fully distinguished from each other, prior to our interpretation of them. The as sumption is based on nothing. At best, it is a use ful myth. Any aspect that is found is found after or through our interpretation of the work. Since naive realists think that such qualities are clearly and distinctly there, like pennies in a jar, they in terpret the radical historicist claim as holding that Joyce's work adds new qualities to Moby Dick. That's a wrong interpretation of radical historicism since it assumes that Moby Dick had a determinate set of qualities prior to any interpre tation. Levinson and Livingston are attacking a straw man.
Aspects are not like pennies in a jar: they emerge through interaction between the readers and the text, and if the reader is influenced by Joyce then the aspect that emerges is one that could not have emerged earlier. It is a false di chotomy to say either we discover aspects or we just add them to the work: the discovered aspects are also constructed. It might be replied that this is a paradox: "how can something be both discov ered and constructed at the same time?" Yet the paradox is unresolvable only if one believes that reality is ultimately clear and distinct. It is only unresolvable if the distinction between discovery and construction is rigid . . Livingston and Levinson do allow for moder ate retroactivism (the view that meaning of a text changes after completion of the text) as long as we stay within the author's oeuvre. Yet why should the author be the only privileged party? Why couldn't we speak just as well of the oeuvre of the school of writing, or even of the nation? Why can't we speak of collective retroactive intentionality? As soon as this is allowed naive realism begins to dissolve.
Just as some authors make naive realist as sumptions about author's intentions, others make such assumptions about the reader's response. For example, Roger Seamon looks for an expla nation of poetry's power in rapid unconscious in ferences." He believes that the poet presents the PHILOSOPHY TODAY 104 reader with contrasted meanings that defeat nor mal expectations, and that the reader is then forced to bridge gaps in order to make sense of the words. Seamon understands reading litera ture along the lines of getting the point (')fa joke: a gap is opened up by the author, which the reader fills unconsciously with a series of inferences. He calls the process "guided rapid unconscious re configuration." The process is guided in the sense that the artist designs the experience, and unconscious because we are not aware of the steps involved. Seamon also stresses that this process is pleasurable.
Seamon has captured an important aspect of our pleasurable experience of poetry. But is it complete? Does this entirely explain the source of our pleasure? Contrast Seamon's theory with the Indian theory of poetry called rasa theory.
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Rasa theory, like Seamon's, emphasizes the plea sure gained from literary works. However, rasa theory places its entire emphasis on the transfor mation of emotions, rather than on cognitive in ference. Rasa originally meant the flavor one gets from tasting the juice of a fruit. It also refers to the essence of a thing and to spiritual delight. In aesthetics it refers to a kind of objectified plea sure. The poet produces a work charged with a dominant emotion. This, accompanied by sub sidiary emotions, produces a certain overall taste or flavor in the reader/viewer (rasa theory was originally developed for drama, but was then ex tended to all ofliterature ). The dominant emotion is objectified and enjoyed as an ideal content. Ev eryday feelings are purified, somewhat like ca tharsis in Greek tragedy. Rasa is achieved in the viewer because the dominant emotion is freed from the unpleasant effects which would attend such an emotion in everyday life. The feelings of everyday life are recollected and lived through again, but at another level. They become general ized, and do not belong to anyone. This process leads, in its most profound form, to a state of ec stasy.
There seems to be some truth in rasa theory not only for Indian poetry but for poetry in gen eral. The theory shares some qualities with West em expression theories of art, although it avoids the disadvantages of crude versions of expression theory.'" It is, in my view, somewhat more plausi ble than Seamon's theory in that it explains why literature seems to give us a different kind of value than jokes. The truth probably lies in a combination of the two theories: capturing both the cognitive and the emotional sides of our pleasure. 21 Rasa theory does not depend on the belief that ultimate reality is determinant, but rather on the belief that it is indeterminate. Seamon, by con trast, understands aesthetic experience somewhat mechanically in terms of a series of inferential steps. Since naive realism requires that reality be ultimately distinct, these steps must be distinct. Seamon knows that we do not actually experi ence these steps, and so he posits them as uncon scious.12 There is no denying that conscious infer ences play an important part in the pleasures of reading poetry, but this does not mean that uncon scious processes are equally inferential, or un derstandable in terms of clear and distinct steps. Unconscious reconfiguration may have a much more organic and emotional quality. If poetic pleasure was just a matter of pleasure taken in rapid unconscious puzzle-solving, then there would be no room for savoring the transforma tion of mood that rasa theory describes.
Colin Martindale's article exemplifies an ex treme version of naive realism, one that bears a striking resemblance to old-time positivism." He holds that humanistic inquiry is not as effective as scientific inquiry, that the only meaningful ques tions are empirical questions, that only science can answer these questions, and that literary the orists know nothing of how to test their hypothe ses. He thinks he can show empirically, contra deconstructionists and others, that people pretty much agree in their interpretations ofliterature.
Yet the logic of Martindale's argument is questionable. He admits that every published in terpretation of Hamlet differs from every other. This should indicate that disagreement of inter pretation is quite widespread. However Martindale responds with the totally ad hoc hy pothesis that such differences are due only to the academic pressure for novelty. No empirical evi dence is given for this claim, or for the fact that people in informal literature discussion groups often have differing interpretations despite the lack of pressure to publish something novel.
More problematic is his method for testing agreement. Martindale simply assumes that agreement in responses to ratings on 7 -point scales is agreement in interpretation. Normally we think of an interpretation of a literary work as a substantial written account. For example, an essay on Hamlet might provide an interpretation of that play. But, as Martindale notes, there is no easy way to quantify such responses. This is why he uses 7 -point scales. Martindale recognizes that some people will have problems with data derived simply from subject responses to rat ing-scaled questions, and so he has an additional experiment in which his student subjects are asked to write about a poem. They are given five minutes to read the poem and fifteen minutes to write about it. Five and fifteen minutes! To call such products "interpretations" is generous at best, as any professor who has read similar ef forts can attest.
One may grant that Martindale has given some reason to believe that for some very low-level types of interpretation there is more agreement than one might expect. He seems right to criticize anyone who says there is equal dis agreement at all levels of interpretation. But none of this supports his claim that disagreements among academics, who have spent considerably more than 15 minutes on the works they interpret, is due simply to the pressure for novelty. His con clusion that "the point of enterprises such as deconstructionism is ... rather unclear" is there fore sadly unsupported. Martindale's methodol ogy is based on the notion that the world is ulti mately distinct (for example that "x's interpretation ofy" is quantifiable in terms of dis tinct properties correspondent to answers to questions with seven-point scales) which, as I have noted, is characteristic of naive realism. 24 For the sake of completeness I will mention the other articles in the issue. Some of these do not make naive realist assumptions but have a similar theoretical slant to articles already dis cussed. Eva T. H 
Conclusion
My aim in this essay has been to show that na ive realism has its limits. My point is somewhat like Kant's. The stuff that goes on beyond the cat egories of the understanding is not understand able by science but is. still important to us. The aesthetic ideas, which Kant saw as essential to the fine arts and in particular to poetry, give us a strange sort of access to the supersensible realm. Why? On my view, it is because this realm (mis named and misplaced by Kant because it is not really beyond sense, only beyond that aspect of the world understandable in terms of clear and distinct ideas) has a metaphorical structure simi lar to that of aesthetic ideas themselves. Kant would have recognized that a scientific or sci ence-like conception of philosophy, advocated by Haack and others in this issue of Philosophy and Literature, is no less problematic than Rorty's reduction of philosophy to mere conver sation. My suggestion is that we need a bit of this Kantian skepticism applied today to naive real tsm. 
